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ABSTRACT
Privacy by Design is prescribed by the new European General
Data Protection Regulation. Geing this privacy preserving design
philosophy appropriately adopted is a challenge, however. One
natural approach to this challenge would be to leverage design
paerns in the privacy domain. However, privacy paerns are scat-
tered, unrelated, inconsistent, and immature. is paper presents a
paern system for user control, which is built upon an existing pri-
vacy paern catalog. By ensuring implementability and uniformity
within descriptions, and establishing relationships using consistent
terminology, we alleviate some of the aforementioned issues.
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•Soware and its engineering→ Patterns; •Security and pri-
vacy→ Privacy protections; Privacy-preserving protocols; Usability
in security and privacy;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Privacy by Design (PbD) was jointly introduced by the Dutch Data
Protection Authority and the Information and Privacy Commis-
sioner of Ontario, Canada of the time [12]. It is a philosophy that
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“ingrains privacy principles into every part of every system” [7]. Data
Protection by Design (and by extension PbD), is a requirement in
the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
is legal framework has an international scope which creates
a punitive mandate for privacy protection (Art. 3, 83). It requires
services established in the EU, or providing any services to EU
residents, to adequately protect privacy (Art. 45). Addressing this
need through PbD requires that privacy be considered from the
Analysis and Design phases. ese phases are oen approached
through design paerns.
Soware design paerns were pioneered by Gamma, Helm, John-
son, and Vlisside [22]. ese are common solutions to recurring
soware engineering problems, oen used as blueprints for design,
and continually improved over time.
An issue frequently faced is how to present paerns in a man-
ner which promotes appropriate use. Privacy paern collections in
particular are lacking in coherence and interconnection. Typically
paerns themselves are improved by being extended or combined
with one another. ey may also work together as compound pat-
terns which combine multiple paern approaches into one.
According to POSA (Paern-Oriented Soware Architecture) [5],
a collection of paerns should support ease of use, comprehension,
and extensibility, using a few natural classication properties which
provide a roadmap to implementation. e rst step towards this is
typically a paern catalog, while a paern system adds accessibility,
consistency, and illustrates paern relationships [5].
is work presents a privacy paern system for user control,
accomplished by elevating a subset of an existing community cata-
log [15] to the paern system [5] level. We improve the consistency
and implementability of these paerns, as well as the application
of the community’s classication scheme. As the catalog is exten-
sive, we limit the scope of the system to the paerns within the
classication focused on user control.
e paper provides soware engineers with the means to facili-
tate user privacy decisions in a manner consistent with the GDPR.
We also provide a basis on which the community can expand to
achieve further systemization, or eventually a data protection re-
lated paern language as dened by POSA [5]. is is the ultimate
goal of the system.
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e following section describes the various eorts within the
community towards privacy paern collections, while Section 3
discusses the process and results of our work. During our presen-
tation of the system, we describe how we adhere to each of the
POSA requirements [5]. In Section 4 we elaborate on our nd-
ings in applying the schema and the paern relationship types
(summarized as relationships), as well as how we address concerns
within our paern system. Finally we provide an overview of our
contributions, conclusions, and suggestions for future work.
2 RELATEDWORK
is section discusses dierent initiatives to gather privacy paerns
as a means to help system engineers. We focus on how these eorts
fall short of system level as dened by POSA [5] or do not apply to
our study domain. According to POSA, there are six requirements
for a paern system. A system of paerns should comprise a suf-
cient base of paerns, which in turn should be organized, and
should support their own evolution as a system. Additionally, all
paerns in the system should be described uniformly. eir descrip-
tions should include implementation details suitable for successful
application, as well as highlight the relationships between them.
Doty and Gupta [13] had started to work on an online cata-
log for privacy paerns, which initially included nine dra privacy
paerns. It used a variety of categories, including Hoepman’s strate-
gies [27]. Lile to no emphasis was placed however on establishing
relationships with other paerns.
Within the PrimeLife project [21], a paern catalog for Human
Computer Interaction (HCI) was formed to assist in designing ac-
cessible user interfaces. is included een paerns for privacy
policies, which covered a number of aspects. Some of these include
icons and the display of privacy information, work ows and interac-
tion paradigms, and holistic approaches to the project itself. ey
include a Related Paerns section, though only as a list of paern
names.
A separate online catalog was set up as part of the PRIPARE
project [8]. It describes 26 privacy paerns, classifying them with
both aribute tags and categories. To express a few relationship in-
stances they use the following sections: related paerns, supporting
paerns, and conicting paerns.
Drozd [16] additionally proposed an online catalog of privacy
paerns which built upon the previous eorts. It presents 38 privacy
paerns in total [17]. For classication, a hierarchical schema and
application area are used. e hierarchy is based on the ISO/IEC
29100 principles and instructions, while the variety of areas non-
exhaustively include: systems’ infrastructure, types of applications,
and components. Paern relationships are not explored.
Lenhard et al. [26] further expand upon the previous collec-
tions in their mapping study. Beyond these, however, they note
various authors which have reported paern languages in specic
domains. Schu¨mmer et al. [33] present such a language with 18
paerns which aim to help control information ow within collab-
orative environments. Chung et al. [9] report a paern language
for developing applications for ubiquitous computing, presenting
15 paerns organized around ‘privacy management’. Haz [24], on
the other hand, arms the rst paern language for developing
Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs). is collection composes
of 12 paerns which revolve around anonymity.
As paern languages, these each show paern relationships.
However, they do not use a formal representation. e ways in
which these collections constitute languages are however limited to
their specic domains. It is also not suggested that these languages
consider the POSA notion of paern language. e denition given
by Lenhard et al. [26] mentions “a set of paerns and their interrela-
tionships and interactions”, while this denition sits closer to that
of a paern system [5]. POSA notes that it is not uncommon to
mix these notions, reminding that a paern language should cover
“every aspect of importance in a particular domain”.
A number of the aforementioned researchers [8, 15, 17] have
begun work as a community. ey maintain an online repository
[15] which hosts various privacy paerns. is community has
taken steps to support soware engineers, gathering considerable
content, and constructing a common schema and classication.
However, the paerns within this repository still lack the paern
relationships and implementability necessary to address more holis-
tic and complex problems. We leverage this community catalog
in the construction of our paern system, which aims to address
these shortcomings for user control.
3 A SYSTEM OF CONTROL PATTERNS
We have established a system of 20 paerns, shown in Figure 1
along with their identied relationships. ey are available at
privacypaerns.org. Each of these is a part of the control classi-
cation from Hoepman’s strategies [27], and is further classied
by a single tactic [10] from that strategy. Distribution of these can
also be seen in Table 3.
e ways in which our system adheres to POSA [5] are each
dened in detail within the following sections. Specically, they
provide six requirements. Our paern system should support its
own organization and evolution. It should also describe a sucient
base of paerns featuring uniform descriptions, relationships, and
implementability.
3.1 Sucient Base of Patterns
At the time of writing there are 32 published privacy paerns
and many more being processed in and outside of the community
repository. Together, they total 86 potential paerns. However, to
maintain a manageable research scope, this work denes a system
of privacy paerns within a subset of those. We have selected pat-
terns classied under the control strategy [27], of which there are
20. is quantity is in line with similar domains such as soware
architecture [5] (19 paerns) and architectural safety [31] (15 pat-
terns). Additionally, three of these paerns are newly introduced
compound paerns, which use a variety of other paerns to provide
a more comprehensive solution to a wider problem.
3.2 Uniform Descriptions
Our system conforms to the schema within privacypaerns.org [15].
We have however added an additional useful eld for implementabil-
ity, Forces/Concerns, which was not explicit in the schema [15].
According to Harrison [25], “forces give substance to the problem, and
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Figure 1: Pattern Organization and Relationships within the System of Patterns
insight into what is behind the symptoms”. Table 1 shows the various
elds collected by the community in addition to Forces/Concerns.
Table 1: Schema Fields by Importance
Required: Name, Context, Problem, Forces/Concerns, Solution,
Implementation, Related Paerns
Optional: Consequences, Constraints, Structure, Examples
Known Uses, Summary, See Also, Also Known As
Within Table 1, elds which were previously optional as per the
community schema, namely Implementation and Related Paerns,
are shown in italics. Due to the importance of implementability and
paern relations in our system, these elds were also made manda-
tory. We sought to ensure that at least the elds we determined to
be Required were uniform in our system’s paerns.
e paerns in this system are described in Table 2. Paern
qualities within are dierentiated by okay, decent (italics), and good
(bold). ese are followed by their assigned tactic. Since many of
these paerns were pre-paerns or otherwise underdeveloped, we
endeavored to improve each one so that they may be consistent,
comprehensive, and usable. is is further explained in Section 3.5.
3.3 Organization
e system of paerns has been organized according to a classica-
tion schema based on privacy design strategies and tactics proposed
by Hoepman [27] and Colesky et al. [10]. ese groupings match
that followed by the community, and allowed us to delineate our
scope to the control strategy.
Table 3 shows the distribution of potential paerns from the
community regarding strategies and tactics. Our paerns are fur-
ther classied by tactics. ese are loosely distinguished by the
means for: (consent) explicit, freely-given, and informed; (choose)
optionally selective or exclusive; (retract) timely and completely
revoked; and (update) accurate and up to date processing within
personal data.
As per Figure 1, paerns sharing the same tactic are shaded
according to the legend on the boom right, while those which are
used within a compound paern are clustered together within its
doed border. Compound paerns are also shaded. Classications
are additionally shown in Table 2
e choose paerns are most prominent, as they handle the
more general rights aorded to users. e GDPR’s focus on con-
sent also generates some aention. Conversely, the others, update
(accuracy) and retract (storage limitations) within Art. 5 clause (d)
and (e) of the GDPR [19], are less represented, likely due to speci-
city. Paerns are positioned to promote relationship visibility.
3.4 Relationships
Explicitly documented relationships are an important feature of a
system of paerns. ey can aid both in writing understandable
paerns and in choosing appropriate paerns for a given problem
and context [29].
We have based our types of relationships on those proposed by
Caiza [6]. However, we have only found instances of the follow-
ing relationships in the paerns we examined: uses, complements,
renes, similar to and leads to. e following sections explore the
distinctions between these relationships.
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Table 2: Patterns Included in the System
Privacy Paern Name Summary
Lawful Consent (consent) A crucial element in privacy protection is ensuring that all sensitive processing is preceded by the
acquisition of freely given, informed, specic, and explicit consent.
Informed Consent for Web-based
Transactions (consent) [4, 23, 32]
is paern describes how controllers can inform users whenever they intend to collect or otherwise
use a user’s personal data.
Obtaining Explicit Consent
(consent) [2, 4, 16, 30]
Controllers require consent to be given willingly and specically when in any way processing the
personal data of their users.
Sign an Agreement to Solve Lack of
Trust on the Use of Private Data Con-
text (consent) [2]
Services of a controller may require users to sign contracts that stipulate their obligations and
processing purposes for which users must consent to use the service. is ensures that users can
trust the controller as it is bound to the contract it signs.
Incentivized Participation
(choose)
Users are more willing to contribute valuable input when they can do so without leaking personal
data, or perceive an equal or greater exchange in value either monetarily or socially.
Reciprocity (update) [33] Let users benet according to the contributions they make.
Pay Back (choose) [33] Give users some benets in exchange for providing information or content.
Support Selective Disclosure
(choose)
Many services (or products) require the collection of a xed, oen large, amount of personal data
before users can use them. Many users, instead, want to freely choose what information they share.
is paern recommends that services Support Selective Disclosure, tailoring functionality to work
with the level of data the user feels comfortable sharing.
Discouraging blanket strategies
(choose) [1]
Give users the possibility to dene a privacy level from a range of options each time they share
content.
Negotiation of Privacy Policy
(choose) [30]
Over time, build user preferences from a privacy-preserving default semi-automatically, through
opt-in/opt-out, semantics, and informed solicitations.
Reasonable Level of Control
(update) [3, 9, 28, 32]
Let users share selectively (push) and make available (pull) specic information to predened groups
or individuals.
Buddy List (choose) [33] By default, isolate users to a selection of social connections in a user-dened circle of trust. Allow
them to expand this circle or create new ones based on the existing members.
Enable/Disable Functions
(choose) [3]
Allow users to decide granularly what functions they consent to before the function is used.
Decoupling [content] and location in-
formation visibility (retract) [1]
Allow users to retroactively congure privacy for location information with respect to the content’s
contextual privacy requirements.
Selective Access Control
(choose) [16]
Allow users to specify who may access the content they generate, both during and aer submission.
Single Point of Contact
(consent) [4, 20]
e Single Point of Contact is a security authority who protects the privacy and security of sensitive
data stored online by validating the authority of requests and ensuring secure communication
channels.
Outsourcing [with consent]
(consent) [11]
e controller has to obtain additional specic, informed, explicit, and freely given consent before
outsourcing data processing to a third party.
Active broadcast of presence
(update) [4, 15]
Users may actively choose to automatically provide updates when they want to share presence
information, to increase both the relevance of, and control over, their sharing.
Private link (choose) [15] Enable sharing and re-sharing without wide public visibility or cumbersome authenticated access
control.
Masquerade (retract) [33] Let users lter out some or all personal information they would otherwise provide to a service.
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Table 3: Strategies and Tactics (Adapted fromColesky, Hoep-
man, and Hillen [10])
MINIMIZE HIDE SEPARATE ABSTRACT
exclude 2 restrict 10
select 4 mix 6 distribute 2 summarize 2
strip 1 obfuscate 3 isolate 5 group 2
destroy 1 dissociate 8
INFORM CONTROL ENFORCE DEMONSTRATE
supply 9 consent 6 create 3 audit 1
notify 6 choose 9 maintain 3 log 1
explain 8 retract 2 uphold 3 report 1
update 3
3.4.1 Uses. e rst relationship to explore is uses (use). As per
Figure 1 it comes in two variants. A paern may use (use) another
if adapting its solution contributes to the resolution of the problem.
It must use it (use), however, if doing so is integral to the solution.
For example, our compound paerns may use their constituent
paerns in their implementation, as they collectively make up an
overall solution, but are not all needed to achieve it. On the other
hand, many of our paerns (15 of them) must use Lawful Consent,
as their solutions are not complete without specic, informed, and
freely given consent. In order to reduce complexity, compound
paerns which must use Lawful Consent are used to indicate that
the same is true for their constituents. is does not apply to other
relationships, however.
3.4.2 Complements. A complements (com) relationship estab-
lishes that two paerns, solving their own problems, may work
together to comprise an anonymous paern to solve a new prob-
lem. For example, we have found that Discouraging Blanket
Strategies complements the Negotiation of Privacy Policy
paern. While the laer allows users to opt-in or opt-out of individ-
ual preferences when rst using a service, Discouraging Blanket
Strategies provides granular privacy levels when sharing per-
sonal data. ese paerns could therefore work together to allow
users to revise their initial privacy seings when sharing.
3.4.3 Refines. A renes (ref) relationship indicates that a pat-
tern provides a more specic solution to a more specic problem
than another more general or abstract paern. We found that
Negotiation of Privacy Policy renes the Reasonable Level
of Control paern. e laer aims to address the provision of
sucient control to users by allowing them to provide information
in a selective and granular way. e former meanwhile addresses
that same problem in a more concrete scenario, at the rst use of a
service.
3.4.4 Similar to. A paern which is similar to (sim) another may
have a problem and or solution in common. Sign an Agreement
to Solve Lack of Trust on the Use of Private Data Context
(or rather, Contractual Consent) shares many similarities in its
solution with Obtaining Explicit Consent. e rst aims to
instill trust in the user through transparency and contractual obli-
gations. e second aims to ensure that user consent is given truly
and willingly. Although at rst they seem complementary, the
solution itself is quite the same. Each point out advantages from
their own perspectives.
3.4.5 Leads to. e leads to (Lds) relationship describes a situa-
tion in which the application of a paern generates a problem which
may be resolved by another paern. Within our single instance,
Masquerade leads to Reciprocity. Masquerade allows the user to
dene a desired identiability level, which could potentially permit
misbehavior. Reciprocity could solve this problem by providing
dierent levels of access depending on the identiability provided.
3.5 Implementability
We have examined and improved the paerns within our system
over a three-step process where each author alternates an edit and
quality check on each paern. Paerns were graded from a selec-
tion of ok, decent, or good at the end of each step. Distribution was
9:8:3, respectively. e ok paerns meet basic implementability
requirements, while decent paerns have more comprehensive con-
siderations. e good paerns fully address a contextual problem.
We have assigned this grade to the compound paerns.
In our review, we sought to ensure that each paern was made
to be in line with the suggestions by Meszaros and Doble [29],
Harrison [25], as well as Gamma et al. [22]. We examined the avail-
able paern source material in depth before altering the paerns
to meet this standard. Despite this, we believe the results of this
would benet from a more thorough evaluation.
As per Harrison [25], we paid special aention to the notion of
Dead Weasels, that is, the pitfalls of overly simplifying or generaliz-
ing the implementation details so that there is only the illusion of
procedure. Where otherwise verbose, we opted for more concise
variations or, where necessary, pointers to detail. In particular, con-
textually relevant relationships are highlighted within the paern
descriptions.
Despite our eorts towards implementability, it is also worth
noting that paern systems do not need to cover all implementation
aspects of an information system [5]. However, as a system should
be extensible, implementability may improve as it grows towards
that of a paern language. is, too, is an aspect worth further
validating.
Paerns may additionally be implemented through the use of
Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETs). PETs arise as concrete
implementations toward providing privacy to the user. Within the
process of this contribution, we have noted that various authors
additionally report continuing work on PETs [16, 23, 24]. On the
one hand, Haz [24] and Graf et al. [23] discuss design paerns
for the implementation of PETs, while, Drozd [16] suggests that
PETs could provide a means for design paern implementation.
We believe that Drozd’s perspective is aligned with our approach.
Future advancement on the paerns in our system could result in
prospective PETs as concrete implementations.
3.6 Evolution
e system of paerns is additionally available on GitHub [14] and
contributes to the community eort. As such it is open to extension.
is holds true for both the paerns themselves, as well as the
classication, relationships, or schema applied to them. rough
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the interface that GitHub provides, each paern’s entire content is
editable. ey are wrien in the MarkDown format which GitHub
supports. Changes are however subject to review by those who the
community chooses to provide privileges to. e potential changes
are submied as Pull Requests.
Outside of the privacy paern community, the paerns in our
system are also capable of evolving independently. Work may be
adapted in future collaborations and perhaps later joined to the
community project. is was already the case with the paerns
delivered by the PRIPARE project on privacypaerns.eu [8], and will
soon include the work by Drozd [17] in privacypaerns.wu.ac.at.
4 DISCUSSION
is section describes insight obtained over the course of our ex-
amination of the paerns. While we identied and scrutinized
potential relationships, various aspects worth further investigation
arose. We for example did not nd instances of requires, conicts,
alternative to, or extends relationships. We nonetheless believe these
relationships to have concrete examples outside the scope of our
system. e following sections highlight additional considerations,
beginning with those concerning the use of the system.
4.1 System Usage
As the paern system is available online, it meets one of the most
important aspects for improving its usability: the ability to browse
well-classied paerns in a central repository [5]. POSA adds that
this single element is more useful than any soware tool or method.
While these might aid in guiding engineers towards appropriate pat-
terns for specic contexts, complete automation is not possible [5].
Instead, by ensuring that our paerns are well sorted, connected,
and described, engineers may determine their best application.
Typically paern selection begins with context identication,
from which the need for use of the control strategy is determined.
Depending on which tactic the engineer focuses on, the relevant
paerns within may be identied. e various relationships inside
the system aid the engineer in selecting other paerns to be used
for appropriate circumstances. is, as stated by previous authors
[29], will allow for solving complex privacy design problems.
4.2 Relational Similarities
In our examination of the relationships apparent in the system, we
found that there exists a distinction between some instances of uses.
Some were supportive instances in which a paern would typically
use another, and may nd optional or situational improvements
on the nal result. Others, however, would have largely decient
solutions without the use of some paerns. is behavior, which is
also discussed in Section 3.4.1, is distinct from the notion of requires.
e requires relationship instead stipulates that the paern in
question cannot be utilized without some other paern (serving a
required function) rst being in place. e paern’s context would
be reliant on the paern it requires, but its solution would be reliant
on the paern it must use.
A common candidate relationship for Lawful Consent was re-
quires. For example, considering whether Incentivized Partici-
pation requires Lawful Consent. is was because paerns like
Incentivized Participation not only must use this paern, but
should ideally do so before being utilized. However, eective con-
sent mechanisms can also be considered during utilization. If we
were to use requires, there are multiple consent paerns, compo-
nents of Lawful Consent in particular, which could be used in
sub-optimal or highly specic circumstances.
We note that this introduces the risk of using inappropriate
paern combinations. For example, only Obtaining Explicit
Consent without ensuring it is informed. To overcome this, each
potentially decient requirement would need additional require-
ments of its own. Instead, we chose must use as a more simple
solution.
We encountered similar uncertainty around whether Recipro-
city and Pay Back leads to Lawful Consent. ese paerns
are susceptible to obtaining illegitimate forms of consent, such
as that acquired to protect emotional investment. For instance,
where users benet without contributing to a service, and risk
losing their benets. Or alternatively, where a desirable feature
or reward is blocked with a personal data requirement. Lawful
Consent addresses this problem. However, this problem should not
exist as a consequence of implementation. It should be prevented
beforehand. Leads to is an aer-eect. erefore, this is also a must
use relationship.
4.3 Optionality
While analyzing the relationships inside our proposed paern sys-
tem, we have seen that in some cases it has been necessary to
determine the level of certainty associated with some relationships.
A concrete case, mentioned within the previous section, is the uses
relationship.
is kind of optionality mirrors Caiza’s [6] automatic navigation
(prescriptive paern usage). Although these notions seem simi-
lar, they refer to dierent perspectives: one to whether paerns
are needed, and another to streamline implementation. Further
research is required to make more concrete assertions.
4.4 Transitive Relation
We found that some paern relationships are transitive. at is, if
a paern relates to some other paern, which relates to another,
then the rst paern indirectly inherits the relationship between
the others. For instance, a paern which uses another, which uses
a third, indirectly also uses the third. is holds true for many
relationships, but we did not nd this property consistently for
the complements, conicts, and leads to relationships. Due to the
tight coupling in these, they do not lend themselves to transitivity.
Paerns can also be similar to or alternative to another in dierent
ways, such as whether solutions are distinct or exclusive. is could
make transitive assertions in these inaccurate.
In addition to traditional transitivity, in some cases, a paern
may inherit a dierent relationship than it shares directly. A con-
crete example of this is Incentivized Participation, which
may use Reciprocity. Because Masquerade leads to Reciprocity,
it also indirectly leads to an implementation of Incentivized
Participation. is is the case so long as the actual implementa-
tion uses Reciprocity. erefore, Masquerademay lead to Incent-
ivized Participation, as this may solve the generated problem.
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Further analysis regarding this topic is required, especially con-
sidering other systems, before general assertions can be made, how-
ever. Where instances of this behavior are useful, they are indicated
in the paern text. Note that Figure 1 does not express relationships
as a result of transitivity.
5 CONCLUSIONS
is paper has introduced a preliminary system of paerns to sup-
port soware engineers in realizing Privacy by Design, specically
providing control to users. is represents a step forward towards
an eventual paern language for informational self-determination,
and then potentially wider privacy issues. e system this paper
presents features qualities which address all of the requirements
indicated by POSA [5], which we nd to be most denitive. ese
requirements included support for organization and evolution, and
a sucient base of paerns featuring uniform descriptions, relation-
ships, and implementability.
By extending the eorts of a paern community to classify and
make available a large repository, a number of requirements were al-
ready in place. With the previous eorts of the community, we were
able to build upon the paerns and achieve the requirements set by
POSA. e improvements we made aided in ensuring uniformity
and implementability in our rewrien paerns. Most notably, the
considerable linking achieved in paern relationships was created
from the ground up.
ese relationships have been aligned with the paerns as they
are at the time of writing. However, this process can be iterative and
thus the relationships may evolve along with the paerns. We have
found that exploring relationships exposes areas for improvement
within the paerns, and thus we expect an iterative process to
improve the system overall.
Suggestions for Future Work
e next step in this system is to involve the paerns under the
inform strategy. is will strengthen the system as a informational
self-determination tool. Additionally, it may benet from an it-
erative uniformity, implementability, and relational examination.
Either the original system or an extended variation would benet
from a validation procedure, potentially through a case study with
a real-world example. Additionally, an expert review or panel of
experts could be used to assess the system. In this scenario, the
experts sought out would likely be experienced soware develop-
ers. Finally, relationship connectors could be enhanced to beer
complement the notations soware engineers are familiar with.
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